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TAXATION - FEDERAL EsTATE TAX - TRANSFERS IN WHICH DECEDENT HAD RESERVED A CONTINGENT REVERSIONARY INTEREST - ST.
Lours UNION TRUST CAsEs OVERRULED - In 1919 decedent transferred
property in irrevocable trust, income to be paid to X £or life and on X's death,
the corpus and accumulated income to be returned to the settlor, if he should
then be living; but if he should then be dead, remainder to Y. The settlor predeceased the life beneficiary and the commissioner included the trust property
in decedent's gross estate under section 302 ( c) of the federal estate tax. The
board of tax appeals 1 reversed this determination, and the board was upheld
by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,2 on the
authority of the St. Louis Union Trust cases.3 Held, the "untenable diversities"
of the St. Lrntis Union Trust cases must be rejected and those cases are overruled. In accordance with Klein v. United States,4 dispositions by way of trust
which provide for return or reversion of the corpus to the donor upon a contingency terminable at his death are properly included in decedent's gross estate
as transfers "intended to take effect in possession and enjoyment at or after his
,death" under section 302 (c) of the Revenue Act of 1926.5 Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 60 S. Ct. 444 (1940). 6
.
Repudiation of the St. Louis Union Trust cases eliminates the confusion

Hallock v. Commissioner, 34 B. T. A. 575 (1936).
Commissioner v. Hallock, (C. C. A. 6th, 1939) 102 F. (2d) 1.
3 Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 39, 56 S. Ct. 74 (1935),
and Becker v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. 48, 56 S. Ct. 78 (1935).
4 283 U.S. 231, 51 S. Ct. 398 (1931).
5 44 Stat. L. 70, now Internal Revenue Code of 1939, § Sn (c), 53 Stat. L. 121.
6 C::hief Justice Hughes concurred on the ground that the case was controlled by
Klein v. United States. Justices Roberts and McReynolds dissented.
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concerning taxability of transfers that provide for the return or reversion of the
corpus to the donor upon a contingency terminable at his death. In Klein v.
United States,1 the grantor conveyed a life estate to X, reserving the fee, which
was to remain vested in the grantor if he survived X; and if the grantor did
not survive X, then to X in fee. Justice Sutherland, speaking for a unanimous
court, rejected the "niceties of the law of contingent and vested remainders,"
and held the death of the grantor to be the "event which brought the larger
estate into being for the grantee," thus justifying inclusion in decedent's gross
estate under section 302 (c). 8 The St. Louis Union Trust cases involved transfers in trust to X for life, remainder to Y; but if X should predecease the
grantor the property to be transferred to the grantor absolutely. Here the Court,
with Justice Sutherland speaking for the majority in two five-to-four decisions,
held that the death of the grantor neither passed an interest to the beneficiaries
nor enlarged their interests. Contrary to the views expressed in the Klein case,
the majority relied upon distinctions between vested and contingent remainders
to hold the interest reserved by the grantor to be a mere "possibility," which
death converted into an "utter impossibility." 9 The St. Louis Trust cases
occasioned widespread criticism.10 In view of the purpose of the statute, i.e.,
to include in the gross estate inter vivos gifts which may be resorted to as a
substitute for testamentary disposition, the position taken by the majority seemed
incorrect. As stated by the justices who there dissented, the purpose of the
state makes it immaterial "what particular conveyancers' device-what particular string-the decedent selected to hold in suspense the ultimate disposition
of his property until the moment of his death." 11 Only technicalities of the law
of conveyancing distinguish these cases from the Klein case, and such a basis
for distinction makes taxability turn upon linguistic refinements and diversities
in local conveyancing law. The principal case is in accord with recent decisions
emphasizing the determination of the present Court to construe modern fiscal
measures according to practicalities rather than by "recondite learning of ancient
property law." 12 However, judicial, rather than legislative, repudiation 13 of the
283 u. s. 231, 51 s. Ct. 398 (1931).
Klein v. United States, 283 U.S. 231 at 234, 51 S. Ct. 398 (1931).
0 Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 39 at 43, 56 S. Ct. 74
(1935).
10 " • • • an almost incredible aftermath of Klein v. United States." Lowndes, "A
Day in the Supreme Court with the Federal Estate Tax," 22 VA. L. REV. 261 at 277
(1936). An "apparent reversal of attitude and decision in Klein v. United States."
Maxeiner, "Reservation of Control by the Settlor of a Private Trust as Affected by
Federal Tax Legislation," 21 ST. Louis L. REv. 275 at 314 (1936). See also, 45
YALE L. J. 684 at 690-692 (1936); 49 HARv. L. REV. 661 (1936); and 34 M1cH.
L. REV. 1002 at 1012-1015 (1936).
11 Helvering T. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 39 at 47, 56 S. Ct. 74
(1935).
12 Principal case, 309 U.S. 106 at II2. Cf. Helvering v. Clifford, (U.S. 1940)
60 S. Ct. 554, commented on in 38 M1cH. L. REv. 885 (1940).
18 The dissenting justices felt stare decisis must govern and that the proper
course was application to Congress for amenµment of the statute. In view of the
conflict in the decisions, Congress' failure to amend the statute to obviate the effect
T
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St. Louis Trust cases pres~nts the problem of retroactive application to trusts
created prior to the principal decision. Since both the transfer and the death of
the settlor in the principal case took place prior to the decisions in the St. Louis
Trust cases, no hardship was occasioned the principal estate by overruling those
cases. But the prevailing opinion implies that transfers created since the date
of the St. Louis Trust decisions will be likewise taxable.14 Such a result will
cause hardship when applied to transfers made i~ reliance upon the overruled
cases.15 Legislative repudiation of the doctrine of the St. Louis Trust cases would
have avoided hardship in such cases. There is much to commend in Justice
Roberts' dissenting view that this was preeminently a case calling for application
of the doctrine of stare decisis.
Robert M. Warren

of the St. Louis Trust cases is difficult to explain. See 53 HARV. L. REV. 884 (1940).
In the past, the treasury has promptly applied to Congress· to undo constructions given
the estate tax by the Supreme Court. Cf. Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931, 46
Stat. L. 1516, enacted to obviate the effect of May v. Heiner, 281 U. S. 238, 50
S. Ct. 286 (1930), holding the reservation by decedent of a life interest in property
conveyed inter vivos to fall putside § 302 (c). And to undo White v. Poor, 296
U.S. 98, 56 S. Ct. 66 (1935), construing§ 302 (d), Congress enacted§ 805 of the
Revenue Act of 1936, 49 Stat._ L. 1744.
14 "We have not before us interests created or maintained in reliance on those
cases. We do not mean to imply that the inevitably empiric process of construing tax
legislation should give rise to an estoppel against the responsible exercise of the judicial
process." Principal case, 309 U. S. 106 at n9. And at p. 122:. "Our problem then
is not that of rejecting a settled statutory construction. The real problem is whether a
principle shall prevail over its later misapplications."
15 As stated in Justice Roberts' dissenting opinion: "If there ever was an instance
in which the doctrine of stare decisis should govern, this is it. Aside from the obvious
hardship involved in treating the taxpayers in the present cases differently from many
others whose cases have been decided or closed in accordance with the settled rule,
there are the weightier considerations that the judgments now rendered disappoint
the just expectations of those who have acted in reliance upon the uniform construction
of the statute by this and all other federal tribunals; and that, to upset these precedents
now, must necessarily shake the confidence of the bar and the public in the. stability
of the rulings of the courts and make it impossible for inferior tribunals to adjudicate
controversies in reliance on the decisions of this court." Principal case, 309 U. S. 106
at 129. The,principal case is also noted in 24 MINN. L. REV. 882 (1940).

